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 Why has there been a sudden upsurge in the politicization of indigenous identities in 
Latin America? Drawing upon constructivist assumptions of ethnic identity, I find that ILO 169 
and the rights contained in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
have been accompanied by a re-construction of indigenous identity in Cajamarca, Peru. 
Communities that are vulnerable to the deleterious effects of natural resource extraction and have 
historically identified as non-indigenous, despite having an indigenous identity in their identity 
repertoire, have re-constructed their indigenous identity as part of a strategy to maintain tenure 
over traditional lands, but only after the fact that power and rights have been awarded to these 
communities by international bodies of law and national legal frameworks alike. That is, bodies 
of law can activate an indigenous cleavage under a condition of grievance. 
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 From 1980 onward, an international legal framework developed to grant special rights to 
indigenous communities has taken root. The International Labor Organization’s Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 No. 169 (hereinafter ILO 169) and the United Nations 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter UNDRIP), broadly grant indigenous 
communities the right to participate in the procedures governing resource extraction enterprises, 
promote the collective rights and self-determination of indigenous communities, and see these 
communities and their members as the subjects of rights rather than solely as objects of 
government policies. This positive development is circumscribed by the context of inequality in 
which these legal frameworks operate, the lack of specificity in the procedural requirements of 
the laws, and their inability to encompass all indigenous communities in their definition of 
“indigenous”. Despite these shortcomings, these international bodies of law have prompted a 
reconstruction of indigenous identity — albeit at a very local level.  Both ILO 169 and UNDRIP 
require that the community that is experiencing the grievance be the one to make its claims 
against the state or a corporate enterprise. These pro-indigenous bodies of law, as limited in their 
effects as they may be, have enabled a reconstruction of indigenous identity around legal 
procedure and environmental stewardship that, as a consequence of procedural requirements, is 
local in nature.  That is, the politicization of an indigenous cleavage does not require a national 
indigenous identity or a national indigenous movement. The dynamics of making a claim under 
ILO 169 or UNDRIP imply that politically visible indigenous issues can be raised from regional 
and local venues.  
 More so than previously in history, the territories held by indigenous communities are a 
site of contention. Much of what is left of the world’s natural resources is now in the territories 
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of indigenous peoples (Anaya 2013), making the lands of indigenous communities commercially 
valuable to the state.  In the name of “development” or the “general interest”, the state has 
resorted to expropriation and other administrative measures to gain jurisdiction over the land and 
the resources that have historically belonged to these communities.  Indigenous communities 
have a sui generis relation to the lands they occupy; the physical and spiritual interdependence 
that exists between these communities and their land, water, and territory, makes the preservation 
of land tenure and the ecological integrity of indigenous lands necessary to ensure the 
community’s survival and cultural integrity (Westra 2008). Mining and other extractive 
enterprises produce irreversible damage to the environment, when not conducted in a sustainable 
fashion. Latin America is particularly vulnerable to unsustainable extraction processes, because 
in many countries development relies upon the exploitation of these natural resources. For policy 
makers, more rapid extraction seems to suggest more rapid development. Unsustainable 
extractive enterprises divert rivers, contaminate water with chemical pollutants, run the risk of 
toxic leaks and chemical spills that can affect water and soil quality, require deforestation that 
threatens biodiversity, and generate immense amounts of heavy metal waste that once leached 
into the soil affect agricultural production for centuries years to come. Indigenous communities 
that live in close proximity to the mine are directly affected by the industrial run-off which can 
result in contaminated water supply or the loss of fertile land, threatening the community’s right 
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to health and and healthy environment . Communities that are displaced by extractive activities 1
face marginalization, food insecurity, job insecurity, and worse poverty than they were in to 
begin with.   
 While these immediate and after-the-fact threats presented by extractive industries are the 
domain of UNDRIP, the 1989 convention of the International Labor Organization Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, also known as ILO 169, refers to the fundamental rights of 
consultation and participation enjoyed by indigenous peoples. The objective of ILO 169 is  to 
achieve agreement or consent when it comes to any government action or policy that may affect 
or change the status of these communities (ILO C169). That is, ILO 169 is concerned with the 
process prior to the establishment of an extractive project on or in the vicinity of indigenous 
territory and is best illustrated by the idea of Free Prior and Informed Consent. The concept of 
Free Prior and Informed Consent (hereinafter FPIC) contained in UNDRIP and ILO 169, is 
specific to the relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands, the loss of cultural and 
intellectual property, and of lands, territories and resources. FPIC must be prior in the sense that 
it must precede the adoption of any legal or administrative measures that might affect the lands, 
territories, resources, and status of indigenous communities. ILO 169, also states that these 
consultations must be had in good faith, must occur through appropriate state procedure, and 
 See case of Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and Embera Indigenous People of 1
Bayano and Their Members v. Panama, Judgement of November 13, 2012, Merits, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Report 125/12, C12.354, where the IACHR  discusses that 
the construction of the Bayan Hydroelectric Complex and the Pan American Highway have 
flooded and consequently destroyed the territory inhabited ancestrally by the Kina and Embera 
peoples of Bayano, which led to an increase of diseases in the indigenous communities, gravely 
impacted the communities traditional way of life, and had a harmful impact on traditional forms 
of subsistence. See also, case of Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgement of 
June 17, 2005, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
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must not exclude the representatives of those indigenous people affected. The specific references 
to land, in conjunction with the special relationship indigenous peoples have with their land, and 
the threat their land is currently under from the neoliberal regime, has made the fulfillment of 
ILO 169 and FPIC a common call of indigenous collective action.   
 ILO 169 and UNDRIP offer the potential to alter collective action strategies by creating 
the incentive to activate the indigenous cleavage within an institutionalized setting. In areas 
where there is a legal harm and a claim to territory, communities that would historically identify 
as peasant communities now claim ILO 169 and UNDRIP rights and are identifying as 
indigenous in front of state actors.  In areas where FPIC procedural rights are in place — even if 
not fully respected— indigenous communities have been given participation in state processes 
that could affect them. While the effectiveness of this participation seems questionable, 
participation may well be better than the prior condition of political exclusion. The presence of 
these procedural rights has activated the ethnic cleavage and has been accompanied by calls for 
environmental stewardship. The reconstruction of ethnic identity that has accompanied the 
formalization of pro-indigenous rights has prompted a reconstruction of ethnic identity that 
emphasizes the indigenous community’s relationship to their territory, land, and water in 
connection the protection of their human rights, indigenous rights, and cultural rights, even in 
places where this cleavage has been historically latent.  
 Peru provides an illustration of this theory.  Despite having one of the largest indigenous 
populations in Latin America, indigenous identification has been historically low in Peru, and 
indigenous movements of consequence have been largely absent from the record (Yashar 1998). 
Bolivia and Ecuador, its northern Andean neighbors, have both formed indigenous movements of 
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political consequence, but none of this political activism by indigenous communities in 
neighboring countries has diffused with much impetus. The collective action that existed in Perú 
on the part of indigenous communities has generally failed to translate into a politics where 
indigenous issues are part of the policy spectrum, which has reinforced the exclusion of 
indigenous issues in the political discussion. Indigenous identity, therefore, has remained latent 
rather than activated, despite the historical presence of grievances experienced by the numerous 
communities that could identify and mobilize under an indigenous identity. 
  Moreover, indigenous communities in Perú faced unique challenges that contributed to 
the suppression of indigenous identity. Agrarian reform failed to relieve social tensions and 
landless indigenous peasants were incentivized to migrate to urban areas where wages were 
higher and employment opportunities were greater than in the highlands. This rural-urban 
migration expanded the identity repertoire of indigenous peoples, heightening the fluidity of 
ethnic identity and providing indigenous peoples with identity options that avoided the negative 
connotations and inherent inferiority associated with the word indígena in their political and 
social context. Additionally, the rise of Shining Path in Peru, along with its internal war in the 
1980’s, lay a heavy toll on the communities of indigenous peasants and fractionalized indigenous 
communities even further. The confluence of these factors created a context of low indigenous 
identification and the high degree of fractionalization precluded a consequential mobilization by 
complicating the process of collective action. The persistence of these conditions has made Perú 
a country in which scholars least expect the political activation of the indigenous cleavage.  
 However, recent developments challenge this assumption. The rights contained in ILO 
169 and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, along with the 
!5
rights given in Perú’s Constitution that have a pro-indigenous tone, have enabled a reconstruction 
of indigenous identity. This reconstruction of indigenous identity has given communities that are 
newly identifying as indigenous and communities that have always identified as indigenous 
political visibility at state, regional, and international levels where it had previously been denied 
to them by historical conditions of economic, political, and social marginalization. Without 
forming a national indigenous movement, the indigenous cleavage is becoming politically active. 
Regional and local indigenous movements are emerging to stand up against the state as 
communities make legal claims against state policies and corporate practices, specifically 
referencing ILO 169, and or UNDRIP. The pre-existing fractionalization in Peru does not 
preclude indigenous mobilization, rather the procedures encompassed in ILO 169 and UNDRIP 
promote this regional dynamic, enabling the politization of an indigenous cleavage where it 
otherwise might not be mobilized. Without the development of a stronger indigenous rights 
framework both at the national and international level, these localized movements would not be 
claiming indigenous status, but rather, are more likely to remain organized around other identity 
cleavages. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any way that these communities might organize 
against the state and private corporations in a fashion that actually engages these parties in some 
sort of communication, given the existence of a protection gap and the immense political, social, 
and economic inequality that exists between these central neoliberal actors and the descendants 
of pre-hispanic nations, whether they identify as peasants or mine workers.    
 Understanding how and why this construction of ethnic identity around legal procedure 
came about, and understanding the benefits and the shortcomings of this construction is 
increasingly important, not only to the study of indigenous identity but to our understanding of 
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human rights, legal procedure, and the economic practice of resource extraction. Equally as 
important, the case of the construction of indigenous identity in Peru also illustrates some of the 
problems that arise from a politics of inclusion and exclusion evoked by the term indigenous. 
 To illustrate how the international legal framework of indigenous rights has prompted a 
reconstruction of indigenous identity that emphasizes the indigenous community’s relationship to 
their territory, land, and water in connection the protection of their human rights, indigenous 
rights, and cultural rights, this paper will proceed in four broad sections. The first section will 
outline the analytical framework under which this argument functions by evaluating theories of 
ethnic identification. The second section will provide the relevant legal and analytical definitions 
and will identify the practical, legal, and theoretical problems associated with assuming these 
definitions. The third section will delve into the broader implications of the intersection of 
ethnicity, natural resource extraction, the state, and international legal bodies. The fourth section 
will closely examine the reconstruction of indigenous identity in Perú around indigenous rights.  
Constructivism and Indigenous Mobilization 
 An indigenous identity is a subset of ethnic identities. That is, an indigenous identity is a 
specific type of ethnic identity that refers specifically to those ethnic groups or communities that 
existed in a given territory prior to colonization. The construction of indigenous identity can be 
analyzed within a constructivist framework. An emphasis on the social construction of identity is 
especially important in Peru, where identification with an indigenous identity relates intimately 
to the political and social processes and structures indigenous peoples have confronted and still 
confront.  
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  Constructivist theories of ethnic identity emphasize the historical construction of 
identity, community, and meaning. Underlying constructivism is the assumption that ethnic 
identities can change over time (Chandra 2012). Individuals often shift the identity categories 
that describe them, sometimes as a product of political and economic phenomena (Posner 2005; 
Monroe et. al 2000). When an ethnic identity becomes salient, that ethnic category becomes 
“activated”; it is also possible to find newly activated ethnic categories that appeared not to have 
existed before (Weiner n.d., cited in Geertz 1973).  That is, it is possible to activate a latent 
identity. Constructivism thus posits that the relationship between ethnicity, politics, and 
economics is fluid. Ethnic identities are primary when identified with, purposive in the sense that 
they provide a basis for social organization, and evolving, as identity holders interact with the 
social environment around them (Posner 2005). 
 By this standard, indigenous identities are also historically constructed and can change 
over time. Although a community has not mobilized as an indigenous community before, this 
should not exclude the community — if it shares certain descent-based attributes — from being 
categorized as indigenous and mobilizing as such. This implication is especially important for 
those individuals who no longer use a pre-hispanic language and or live in areas where mestizaje 
has occurred for longer periods of time, but do share certain descent-based attributes. Indigenous 
mestizos or cholos, can still ascribe to an indigenous identity, even if they have not done so 
previously in their lifetime. However, the more important question is what explains the 
motivations of these communities to seek to activate the indigenous cleavage when they 
otherwise would not have done so?  
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 According to constructivism, assertions of ethnicity are underscored by a group’s desire 
to achieve dignity (Varshney 286, 2007; Horowitz 1985). Given that “dignity” is broadly defined, 
constructivism must be placed within a social, political, and economic context. The context in 
which this reconstruction of indigenous identity is occurring is primarily characterized by 
inequality. The one obvious inequality is that of political, social and economic power, that exists 
between indigenous peoples and the dominant social group — and, in consequence, the state. 
Historically, indigenous communities in Latin America have comprised the lowest rung on the 
social and economic ladder and were — until recently — often legally defined as second-class 
citizens. Most of Perú’s Indians were not even enfranchised until 1985, when illiterate sectors of 
the population were given right to vote. Access to education, health care, clean water, and 
electricity, is difficult to come by in many indigenous communities — even for those that are not 
secluded. According to INEI’s 2008 Home Census, 32.05% of Peru’s Quechua population, 
25.86% of the Aymara Population, and 46.96% of the indigenous non-quechua non-aymara 
population live in extreme poverty.  States have also failed to demarcate indigenous land, or have 2
failed to enforce and implement grants to land that have been given in the past. That is, the state 
assumes it has the power to extinguish land titles and has usually done so with indigenous 
territories. This stands in contrast to the legal protection to private property given by the state to 
its non-indigenous citizens. Such inequality places indigenous communities in a heavily 
disadvantaged position from the very beginning: the state neither protects these communities and 
their rights nor does it play an active job in trying to improve their social, political, and economic 
 Censo INEI Vivienda, 2008, INEI.2
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standing. This leaves indigenous communities vulnerable to state, corporate actors, and national 
and international market forces that seek to encroach upon or expropriate indigenous territory.  
 The second aspect of inequality under which FPIC operates is that between the host state, 
which indigenous peoples are citizens of, and global economic actors, such as corporations, the 
World Bank and the IMF. Scholars of Latin American, Asian, and African development have 
stressed the existence of structural, political, and economic inequalities as a result of imperialism 
and the expansion of capitalist hegemony “in the context of a world system” (Carnoy 1984; 
Gunder Frank 1978, Cardoso and Faletto 1971). Resource extraction in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia by developed states such as Canada, Australia, and the United States, amongst others, 
results in underdevelopment. Underdevelopment is characterized by a highly unequal wealth 
distribution both among extractor states and host states, and the citizens of the host states. 
Foreign debt held by Latin American states in the 1980s and the 1990s resulted in further 
incursions into Indian territories in rainforest regions, and adjustment programs encouraged the 
privatization of communal lands (Brysk 10, 2000).  Economic need and the desire for economic 
growth leads states to invite third parties to provide the capital require to extract valuable 
resources, however, the historical record shows that interaction between the periphery and 
developed, capitalist countries does not necessarily lead to democratic outcomes, but rather to 
inequality, exploitation, dependency and hence underdevelopment.  
 Implicit in the second characteristic of the context in which FPIC operates is the pressure 
to extract massive amounts of resources. The current neoliberal paradigm requires a continuous 
supply of oil and mineral resources to maintain afloat. This pressure makes states and corporate 
actors very interested in indigenous lands, resulting in expropriation for the acquisition of 
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valuable natural resources. Some of those lands that have not been expropriated have been 
damaged by deforestation and erosion, mercury contamination from gold mining, and oil spills 
— few among many possibilities — as a consequence of natural resource extraction.  
 These conditions of inequality produce a real and immediate threat to indigenous 
territory, culture, and livelihood presented by continuing resource extraction within conditions of 
immense asymmetry. This provides a specific grievance that can now be addressed through legal 
procedure in both domestic and international courts. Grievance, the literature notes, is often a 
powerful catalyst for collective action (Cederman et. al 2008). Indigenous actors, have therefore 
pursued legal strategies of organization, where such a strategy had previously not been an option. 
Some indigenous communities are therefore taking it upon themselves to learn to engage in such 
a procedure, if they do not chose to hire a non-indigenous lawyer to represent their claims in 
front of a government court or international legal body. Even when they do, the decision to claim 
their international rights in a court of law speaks to the changing strategies and images 
indigenous communities are willing to adopt to challenge state practices and policies (Rodriguez-
Garavito 2011). While the reconstruction of ethnic identity around an institutionalized legal 
framework has given marginalized ethnic communities a voice in the political process, it is 
insufficient to bring about desired outcomes efficiently. 
 Given the context of threat, inequality, and a newly granted participation, the construction 
of indigenous identity is well explained by realistic group conflict theory. Realistic group conflict 
theory posits that social identities are a by-product of intergroup stratification. Indigenous 
communities have been historically marginalized, socially, politically and economically, and 
therefore fulfill the precondition of stratification. In order to produce identification, a third party 
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has to categorize individuals. This function is now fulfilled by the international and domestic 
bodies of law that grant specific rights to those communities who fit the requirements to qualify 
as “indigenous”, but has been previously been fulfilled by different state apparatuses that have 
sought to suppress indigenous populations since colonial times. The difficulty of identifying as 
“indigenous” in Latin America, is that the category has historically connoted a low-prestige 
group. Individuals avoid identifying with low-prestige groups, because doing so lowers their 
self-esteem (Monroe et. al 2000).  As a result, of such connotation and of the ethnic intermixing 
that is natural of Latin America, people who do share indigenous descent-based attributes, might 
seek to downplay these to not be or feel at a disadvantage. However, when people do come to 
terms with membership in and decide to identify with low-prestige groups, they may attempt to 
gain entry in the dominant group, or they may interpret their group’s traits as a badge of pride, or 
they may engage in collective action designed to raise their group’s status. Historically, the case 
has been the former, but in more recent history, since indigenous rights have been given by 
international bodies, the latter has become more common. 
 ILO 169 and UNDRIP have increased the likelihood of indigenous people interpreting 
their group’s traits — specifically their relationship with the land they inhabit — as a source of 
pride, and have motivated indigenous communities to engage in collective action that is aimed to 
raise their group’s status, but nevertheless often falls short of the goal. Yashar (1998) and Hechter 
and Okamoto (2001) both agree that preexisting networks are necessary conditions for the 
creation of organizational capacity required to sustain collective action. In the case of Latin 
America’s indigenous peoples, the immediate community and peasant unions provide the 
preexisting networks that allow for the transformation of identity in the face of a specific 
!12
grievance. Yashar argues that democratization has expanded political opportunities, thereby 
allowing the development of civil society.  In this case, the development of an international legal 
framework has permitted the participation of indigenous communities within state institutions. 
Neoliberalism, specifically the practice of resource extraction, has become synonymous with the 
culpable state under international law, and therefore has enabled indigenous communities to 
target the state and corporate actors for retribution and guarantees. 
Complicated Cultural Politics 
 ILO 169 and UNDRIP seek to achieve agreement or consent when the rights of 
indigenous communities to health, territory, and livelihood overlap with state pressures to extract 
mineral resources.  The concept of FPIC, contained in both UNDRIP and ILO 169, is specific to 
the relocation of indigenous peoples from their lands, the loss of cultural and intellectual 
property, and of lands, territories, and resources. FPIC must be prior in the sense that it must 
precede the adoption of any legal or administrative measures that might affect the lands, 
territories, resources, and status of indigenous communities. ILO 169 also states that these 
consultations must be had in good faith, must occur through appropriate state procedure, and 
must not exclude the representatives of those indigenous people affected. The specific references 
to land, in conjunction with the special relationship indigenous peoples have with their land, and 
the threat their land is currently experiencing from the normal processes of the neoliberal regime, 
have made the fulfillment of ILO 169 and FPIC a common call of indigenous collective action.  
 FPIC, as expressed in ILO 169, does not provide a specific timeframe for the 
consultations, nor are there any regulatory frameworks to oversee the compliance of FPIC goals. 
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It is the responsibility of each state to manage its FPIC processes as it sees fit, and it is the 
responsibility of judges to interpret ILO 169 with the strength and breadth they wish to give it. 
Consent, as suggested by FPIC, could mean that the indigenous group in question be able to veto 
a project or policy that after the period of discussion, information gathering, and consultation, it 
finds it cannot approve because it violates the rights of the community or changes it status 
considerably. Consent, therefore requires consultation. However, most courts have been reticent 
to give indigenous communities the power to veto a project or policy. Consent in FPIC is limited, 
vague, and resembles involvement or participation more so than it does a process in which 
indigenous communities have decisive power to successfully protect their rights.  
 Indigenous communities therefore are required to participate in the process of FPIC, but 
this participation is truncated by the courts’ unwillingness to grant the process with the tools 
necessary to empower this communities and the absence of regulatory frameworks within which 
FPIC is excepted to function. FPIC consent requires consultation, and both FPIC consent and 
consultation ought to require full prior disclosure of all relevant information presented in a 
language that is fully understandable by those affected by the project or policy. Oftentimes, there 
are domestic law requirements for FPIC. The existence of these domestic requirements is a very 
weak and general positive for indigenous communities. 
 By ILO 169 and UNDRIP, FPIC applies only to those legal and tribal communities that 
have been recognized by the state and have no access to proper judicial remedies domestically. 
FPIC litigation has become an important aspect of indigenous communities’ collective action 
repertoire, but the participation FPIC awards is only marginally effective. However, some 
participation is better than no participation. The political marginalization of indigenous 
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communities has improved if only by a small degree. The problem with FPIC is not only the 
context within which it functions, but the natural vagueness of the language it uses to protect 
indigenous communities. In order to put FPIC in effect, the court must be able to make the 
distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous and legitimate and illegitimate claims as well 
as it must be able to draw a conclusion about the indigenous community making a legitimate 
claim having access to sufficient and effective regulatory frameworks to address the threat 
domestically. 
 The definition of indigenous, whichever is assumed, comes with a set of limitations and 
complications. Van Cott (2005, 2) and Madrid (2012, 6) define indigenous peoples as noted by 
the United Nations Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities:  
“Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
considered themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those 
territories or parts of them (United Nations 1986, para. 379).” 
 This definition identifies indigenous peoples as a subset of ethnic groups who descend from and 
identify with the original or first inhabitants of a specific region. The necessary attributes for 
indigenous status are descent and self-identification as part of a distinctive, non-dominant, 
subgroup within the national territory. However, the problem with this definition arises with 
defining “historical continuity”. Stavenhagen suggests that historical continuity can be 
established not only through self-identification but also through the use of a pre-hispanic 
language (2002). Both the issues of self-identification and the use of an indigenous language 
limit the breadth of the definition.  
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 Self-identification as indigenous is not a straightforward issue, especially where historical 
political and social processes have complicated identification with an indigenous identity in 
Latin America. Mestizaje refers to the biological process of mixing between people of European 
and indigenous descent that began in the colonial era, and the cultural process of assimilation 
whereby indigenous people suppress their native customs and begin to identify as mestizos, that 
is, of mixed descent. Mestizaje has had two major consequences in Latin America. Mestizos have 
come to represent the demographic majority in Latin American countries as self-identification as 
mestizo has risen both due to the negative associations with the word indigena and the source of 
indigenous identity which is very often specific and localized in ways census data fail to capture 
(Sanborn 2015, 6). Mestizaje has therefore blurred the lines of ethnic identification, as 
individuals who self identify as mestizos can very well be indigenous peoples and might self-
identify as indigenous if their regional indigenous category was included in the census instead of 
the generic term indígena. Additionally, there are those of indigenous descent and appearance 
who have adopted mestizo identities, who are colloquially classified as cholos in the Andean 
region. That is, the identity repertoires of peoples of indigenous descent and speakers of 
indigenous languages is broader and more complex than the legal definition acknowledges.   
 Use of an indigenous language, on the other hand, is empirically easy to measure. 
However, certain state policies, such as voting requirements or education policies, and social 
processes, like mestizaje, have reduced the prevalence of indigenous languages among 
indigenous communities. In other words, deriving indigenous status solely from the use of an 
indigenous language could leave out individuals and communities that do not speak the language 
but nevertheless share certain descent based attributes that might lead them to identify with the 
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indigenous identity that exists within their identity repertory under specific political 
circumstances. 
 The definition of indigenous could better take into account the cultural, linguistic, 
demographic, and other changes that communities have experienced as results of processes that 
have been encouraged or imposed by the dominant sectors of society. In other words, language 
might have been lost as a result of mestizaje or voting requirements that have incentivized 
indigenous people to learn the language of the dominant majority. When census data only looks 
at the use of an indigenous language, then communities that could identify as indigenous are 
labeled as mestizo, which limits the community’s ability to make claims on the basis of 
indigenous status, if we assume self-identification does not require the use of an indigenous 
language. Alternatively, when individuals are asked for their ethnic identification, they might still 
identify as mestizo, because the options provided by the survey exclude the particular indigenous 
community or tribe these individuals identify with or because there are specific benefits to 
ascribing to a mostly mestizo identity on a day to day basis. Moreover, the social and cultural 
practices that are traditionally understood to be indigenous have evolved as a result of 
modernization encroaching upon these communities and government programs that specifically 
aim to suppress — if not eliminate — the indigenous cleavage. That being said, self-
identification or descent-based attributes ought to be the only necessary conditions for qualifying 
as an indigenous person.  
 While the threat posed by natural resource extraction to these communities is presently 
obvious, and their use of ILO 169 ought to be straightforward, the vague terminology within ILO 
169 and UNDRIP complicate the matter. Firstly, ILO 169 is not explicit about what it means 
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when it refers to consent and consultation, nor does it give a specific timeline. Additionally, ILO 
169’s definition of “indigenous peoples” is not fully equipped to take into account the historical 
evolution of culture, economy, and language experienced by indigenous communities as sectors 
of a non-dominant group. Considering that the definition of “indigenous” provided by ILO 169 
can be limiting in certain instances, it follows that the communities that claim ILO 169 be 
relatively well versed in what the procedure necessitates, but they must also emphasize the 
characteristics that allow them to claim such rights and access to FPIC and legal procedure.   
Peru: The Limits of Cultural Politics 
 Peru has been identified by the literature as the country with, historically, the lowest 
levels of indigenous mobilization in Latin America (Yashar 1998; Becker 2008). Peru’s trajectory 
from colonial times to modernity, however similar it may be to Latin America’s political and 
economic hubs of colonial times, is subtly different in ways that have limited the development of 
a national indigenous movement as the ones that exist in Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The 
indigenous cleavage in Peru has been strongly suppressed by the government, which has 
somewhat succeeded at organizing its indigenous peoples along class and occupational 
cleavages. Despite low levels of indigenous identification, indigenous identity in Peru is highly 
localized. While the localized nature of indigenous identification in Peru impedes the formation 
of a national indigenous movement, it does not do the same for the sort of community action 
required to mobilize around ILO 169 and UNDRIP and to make claims in a court of law. The 
political opportunity structure that was not awarded by modernization — which Yashar credits as 
the catalyst for national indigenous movements elsewhere in Latin America — is given by the 
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articulation of an international body of indigenous rights and the incorporation of these rights in 
state constitutions.  
 Indigenous communities in Perú, as in other Andean countries, are not a unitary set of 
actors. They are divided amongst highland Indians and lowland Indians, each with different 
historical experiences. This cleavage has been described as cross-cutting (Brysk 2000), however, 
these two groups of indigenous communities live in markedly different conditions as a result of 
their interaction or lack thereof with a white hispanic culture. Highland indigenous communities 
can now be described as mountain peasants, and have been the longest involved with Hispanic 
states and markets. Lowland Indians, inhabit jungle areas, sometimes still function as hunter 
gatherer communities, and have been least in contact with the Western world. Like the majority 
of Latin American indigenous populations, Peru’s Andean indigenous communities are 
impoverished, rural highland peasants, with some knowledge of both Spanish and a pre-hispanic 
language, and syncretistic religious, cultural, and economic practices (Brysk 2000, 6). Some of 
these highland communities have migrated to urban centers and work in various low-skill jobs in 
order to send back money and goods to their families. The cultural and biological intermixing of 
cultures over time illustrates the variation between highland communities, which might not still 
make use of a pre-hispanic language or traditional modes of dress and religion as often as the 
definition might demand them to, and lowland communities, who exist in a more insular capacity 
and more easily fit the preconceived notions of indigeneity.  
 Scholars suggest that political policies and institutions can affect the strength and 
existence of ethnic group boundaries (Nagel 1994; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 2004; Reilly 2002). 
In the case of Perú, this assertion proves true. The lack of a modern state to replace the collapse 
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of corporatism, Sendero Luminoso’s war, the exclusivity of voting requirements, the absence of 
specific indigenous categories in Perú’s census, and the late introduction of universal suffrage all 
succeeded at organizing indigenous communities around class lines rather than ethnic lines. The 
cleavages activated by the Peruvian government have succeeded at suppressing a national 
indigenous identity. Therefore when indigenous identity does emerge, it does so at very localized 
levels, which is exactly what ILO 169 and UNDRIP both empower and constrain, as localized 
identification specifically demarcates the community that is suffering a harm and giving rise to a 
claim.  
 Yashar identifies the rise of a modern, liberalized state in the 1980s as critical to the rise 
of indigenous movements. Under the corporatist state, the state succeeded in suppressing 
indigenous identity and organizing indigenous communities along class lines. The policy back 
then was one of integration of indigenous communities with the state and the rest of its citizens. 
In Peru, no modern state has emerged to replace the collapse of corporatism (Paredes 2008). This 
has continued to strengthen class cleavages rather than ethnic cleavages. With the end of the 
haciendas in 1978 and the agrarian reform project that the military government decided to 
undertake in the late 1970s, indigenous communities remained organized through peasant 
cooperatives, which had the effect of dividing indigenous peasants’ interests and motives. 
Peasant leaders were coopted by the democratic government that followed the military 
government, which centralized peasant demands. This effectively instilled a lack of trust among 
indigenous peasants, their communities, and their organization. Furthermore, Sendero’s War in 
1980 -1985 had devastating consequences for the ability of indigenous peasants to organize 
collectively. Most of Sendero’s victims were outspoken indigenous leaders. This created distrust 
!20
outside the boundaries of the local community and it closed off spaces of political association 
and discourse, as the government restricted rights (Mealy et. al 2012).  
 Indigenous identity has been further suppressed by state census policies and the late 
development of universal suffrage in Perú. Prior to 1979, literacy requirements prohibited most 
indigenous peoples from taking part in electoral processes. These literacy requirements placed an 
emphasis on acculturation, driving down identification with indigenous culture, as indigenous 
peoples became further associated with second class citizenship. As part of the state’s emphasis 
on integration and acculturation, indigenous categories have been largely absent from Perú’s 
census data in the 1970’s and the 1990’s (Paredes 2008).  It is only very recently that Perú has 
reincorporated questions that deal explicitly with ethnic identification. Once it was determined 
that the application of ILO 169 necessitated a way to differentiate indigenous communities from 
non-indigenous communities, the government became interested in collecting this data. The 2007 
census identified indigenous populations in Peru, but was widely criticized for being 
unrepresentative. The 2017 national census will include self-identification questions that should 
allow a better understanding of the ethnic context in Peru. The active suppression of indigenous 
identity by past state policies, however, constrained identification along indigenous lines and 
strengthened class based identifications. 
 Peru ratified ILO 169 in 1994 and incorporated the same law to the Peruvian Constitution 
in August 2011. The promulgation of ILO 169 provided some of the regulations necessary to 
define ILO 169 procedure more concretely: that consultations be held directly with the members 
of the indigenous peoples affected by economic activities developed in their territories. Third 
parties could become informed about the indigenous communities their project would affect by 
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consulting the national government which has an official database counting 52 native cultures, of 
which 28 are in the amazon and 4 are in the highlands. This government database seeks to 
answer the question of who is legally indigenous. However, the information contained in this 
database was gathered in the 2007 census, which sought to include ethnic and cultural 
information in all of Perú’s regions. Indigenous and international organizations alike have 
denounced the census for not traveling sufficiently far and wide enough to capture all of Peru’s 
indigenous communities appropriately in the census. Moreover, the objective criteria used to 
determine indigenous status included speaking an indigenous or native language and living on 
communal lands recognized by state agencies — a factor which is meant to reflect historical 
continuity. Both of these criteria have been shown above to be unnecessarily limiting. The third 
objective criteria used to determine indigenous status is self-identification. Self-identification is 
the only criteria that finds support in the Peruvian Constitution, which states that indigenous 
peoples and communities are those who self-identify as indigenous and are pre-existent to the 
Peruvian state (Peruvian Constitution Art. 2, § 19).  
 Indigenous self-identification is a particularly complex issue in Perú. Public opinion 
surveys suggest that Perú has a population that self-identifies as indigenous that is as high as 
24.6% (World Values Survey 2006), but they also suggest that self-identification is as low as 7% 
(LAPOP 2008).  The variation is in part due to the way the questions and the surveys are 
formulated and in part due to the availability of answers that allow survey respondents to identify 
with the specific indigenous group that they identify with (Sulmont 2012). Indigenous 
identification in surveys seems to increase when questions about place of origin native language, 
parents’ native tongue, and customs practiced at home are included and when survey respondents 
!22
are allowed to identify as Aymara, Quechua, Uraina, and so on. Moreover, existing surveys are 
not able to capture the situational context in which self-identification occurs. The issues of self-
identification, the use of limiting criteria, and the way the government survey was constructed 
deny official recognition to many highland communities that exist in a capacity to claim 
indigenous status. Indigenous status is therefore not measured with an acknowledgement of the 
500 year long process of transformation most indigenous communities have undergone. Most of 
these communities have ceased to exist in the more isolationist capacity preferred by the 
Peruvian state and instead exist in conditions that reflect historical, political, and technological 
entanglement with a dominant Hispanic culture. That is, the government is currently unwilling to 
recognize that these  communities have been transformed by Spanish colonial presence, the birth 
and evolution of the Peruvian State, capitalism, and neoliberalism alike.  
 Those indigenous communities recognized by the government, and even those that are 
not, are mobilizing around an indigenous identity where they otherwise might not have, 
specifically referencing violations to ILO 169 the FPIC process. Indigenous organizations that 
acknowledge the historical changes experienced by both lowland and highland indigenous 
communities have surfaced in Peru and have taken an active role in articulating an organization 
strategy that will facilitate a national indigenous movement towards self-determination — a 
phenomenon that has never been given attention to in Peru. The Pacto Unidad de Organizations 
Indigenas y Campesinas, United Pact of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations, (hereinafter 
PUOIC) was founded in 2014. PUOIC holds that the generic definition of indigenous or original 
peoples, must be understood to be composed by a diversity of communities that organize and 
express themselves as peasant communities, agrarian federations, or otherwise, and self-identify 
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as indigenous. PUOIC has proposed to the Peruvian government a series of minimum principles 
for the application of FPIC and have also called upon the Inter-American Court to Distinguish 
between consultation and consent. PUOIC’s minimum principles stress an indigenous vision of 
development where the government takes a more active role in improving the basic life 
conditions of indigenous communities, upholding indigenous right to property and to judicial 
protection, and prioritizing environmental protection over economic development. Since its 
foundation, PUOIC has amassed support from 80 indigenous delegates from different 
communities and has actively supported communities in FPIC negotiations and resource 
extraction related protests. The popularity of these organizations stress the fluid character of self-
identification and challenges categorical ethnic boundaries by illustrating how individuals can 
ascribe to more than one ethnic category. These ethnic categories coincide with the rural-urban 
cleavage. That is, a campesino may be both indigenous and mestizo and can invest in his or her 
indigenous cultural heritage despite having lost the use of an indigenous language. 
 Despite ratifying ILO 169 in 1994, the Peruvian government enacted a series of 
presidential decrees in 2009 that were aimed at promoting and regulative extractive industry 
activities in the Amazon (Goulden 2008). Foreign and domestic companies obtained permits for 
petroleum, biofuel, and hydroelectric projects on indigenous people’s lands and 58 out of 64 oil 
concessions overlaid with lands titled or used by officially recognized indigenous peoples 
(Informe Alternativo 2015). Officially recognized indigenous communities could more readily 
claim violations of FPIC in a court of law, whereas communities in the highlands had a more 
difficult time engaging with the legal process once concessions to extract resources were given to 
corporations. Indigenous communities only began engaging with the state more successfully 
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after ILO 169 had been incorporated to the Peruvian constitution. Between the date of ILO 169’s 
incorporation and September 2015, 27 FPIC processes were officially initiated, all of which were 
taken to the conclusions required by the law. Only two of these processes, however, have resulted 
in the implementation of the consensual agreement (Informe Alternativo 2015). The FPIC 
processes initiated by highland communities are often encountered by the argument that “the 
government data base of indigenous peoples does not include this population, therefore they may 
not exercise the right of prior consultation” (Informe Alternativo 2015).  
  The Conga Mine case is particularly illustrative of the reconstruction of indigenous 
identity that has occurred since the adoption of ILO 169. The Conga Mine is located in the 
department of Cajamarca in the Peruvian highlands. Cajamarca was one of the places of earliest 
Spanish settlement in Peru and was the location where Atahualpa, the last emperor of the Inca 
empire, was killed by the Spanish conquistadores. This lengthy interaction with a hispanic 
dominant culture, from Spanish colonization to the present Peruvian state, has expanded the 
identity repertoire of communities in Cajamarca and in communities with similar historical 
processes. Only one community of 988 inhabitants is designated as indigenous in the Peruvian 
government’s database — suggesting that only 0.07% of Cajamarca’s population is indigenous 
and that this population exists in a remote geographic location on Ecuador’s border (INEI 2007). 
However, more than 100 communities in Cajamarca are registered with the government as 
campesino communities, which implies that they are of indigenous descent and have the capacity 
to identify as indigenous in certain contexts .  3
 See Peru’s National Database of Indigenous People: http://bdpi.cultura.gob.pe/lista-de-pueblos-3
indigenas 
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  Mineral Yanacocha, owned by Newmont Mining Corporation, Compañia de Minas 
Buenaventura, and Corporacion Financiera Internacional, began construction of the Conga Mine 
project in 2010 after President Humala declared that consultation was not necessary in the 
Peruvian highlands, because the communities were not indigenous communities but peasant 
communities. Mineral Yanacocha’s presence in Cajamarca, however, is long lived. For over 20 
years Mineral Yanacocha has extracted gold along the northern Andean mountain range with 
little regard to environmental concerns. The Conga mine, a five billion dollar investment that is 
to produce a gold and copper extraction site, is located at the convergence of 5 major river basins 
and threatens to alter Cajamarca’s surface water drainage system.  What is more, is that prior to 
the Conga Mine, Cajamarca’s communities had not risen up to protest or press charges against 
Mineral Yanacocha’s operations, despite the enormous environmental damage these had already 
created.  
 In 2011 the communities of Cajamarca protested the construction of the Conga mine for 
the lack of consultation in its environmental impact process.  The protest movement began in 
collaboration with GRUFIDES, a Peruvian NGO with indigenous undertones that promotes 
compliance with human and environmental rights. GRUFIDES activists helped organize 
CONCAMI and ORPIAN-P members in Cajamarca to pursue legal action in front of the 
Interamerican Court of Human Rights and national courts of law.  ORPIAN was founded in late 
2010 during the initial unrest that led to organized protests and represents the interests of the 
indigenous peoples of Perú’s northern Amazon and the Cajamarca department. While the 
government only recognizes three indigenous towns, ORPIAN recognizes over 300 indigenous 
towns in its jurisdiction. The protests escalated and on July 4, 2012, President Humala declared a 
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state of emergency in the districts of Celedín, Hualgayoc, and Cajamarca. The military was 
brought in to control protestors, which resulted in the incarceration of many of the movement’s 
leaders. On September 3, 2012 the state of emergency was lifted— a month before Mineria 
Yanacocha announced it would temporarily suspend the project.  
 The difficulties establishing the necessity of consultation in the Conga Mine Project 
illustrate the limits of ILO 169.  The communities that mobilized were not those identified as 
indigenous in the government’s database. The government only identified the Aguaruna 
community as worthy of indigenous designation and hence FPIC processes, while both the 
popular movement and the legal proceedings against Conga Mine were largely enacted by 
Caxamarcas, Huambos, Bracamoros, Acuntas, Coremarcas, Llaucas, Cutervos, Chachapoyas, 
Nehipes, Tomependas, Mandingas, and Cañares (Conclusiones y Acuerdos 2014). The large 
number of peasant communities claiming indigenous status in Cajamarca suggests that these 
individuals did not identify as indigenous in Peru’s 2007 national census — if their presence was 
captured by the census at all. What is more, these communities did not claim indigenous status, 
despite the long presence of Mineral Yanacocha, until special rights were awarded to 
communities designated as indigenous. The role of NGO’s like GRUFIDES in giving these 
communities education and access to legal resources is important to the reconstruction of 
indigenous identity that is occurring in places like Cajamarca. 
 What is notable, is that this reconstruction process of indigenous identity in Cajamarca 
did not wane once the limits of the mine’s construction and operation were defined by violent 
local opposition. Rather, representatives of Cajamarca’s indigenous peasant communities 
organized the First Regional Assembly of Indigenous Communities on December 27, 2014. 
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During this assembly the communities published a document of conclusions and agreements 
which reaffirms the indigenous identity of these peasant communities.  The document was signed 
by 200 representatives of indigenous and indigenous peasant communities and speaks of an 
indigenous cosmovision, stressing the unique relationship and dependence indigenous 
communities have with their lands. Additionally, the document emphasizes the need for 
government and compliance with ILO 169 (Conclusiones y Acuerdos 2014, 9). The communities 
also commit themselves to strengthening the communities by investing in legal resources and 
education (Conclusiones y Acuerdos 2014, 10).  
 The widespread appeal of this document in Cajamarca, a department where peasant 
communities have traditionally identified as mestizo speaks to this reconstruction of indigenous 
identity that has accompanied the enactment of pro-indigenous bodies of law. Moreover, the 
exclusion of peasant communities from FPIC consideration illustrates the under-inclusiveness of 
the legal definition of indigenous utilized in ILO 169. The contextual nature of self-identification 
and the diverse variety of living conditions indigenous communities exist in, problematize the 
ability to establish a bright line rule for the determination of indigenous status. This problem of 
determination affects such communities’ abilities to bring forth claims that produce even a 
minimum dialogue between the parties. While the Conga Mine ceased operation and any further 
construction has stopped indefinitely, these results were not achieved through legal procedure. 
The federal government stood by its position to deny FPIC to Cajamarca’s communities. Thus, it 
was the steady flow of local, grass-roots opposition, organized around demands for FPIC and a 
protection of an indigenous cosmovision that was able to protect further encroachment on the 
lands of these communities and individuals.  
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Conclusions 
 ILO 169’s FPIC is demonstrably not specific enough in its definition of procedural 
requirements nor is it inclusive enough in its definition of indigeneity to capture the contextual 
nature of self-identification and the diversity of living conditions enjoyed by indigenous 
communities, even within subnational units, such as Peru’s department of Cajamarca. 
Nevertheless, FPIC and pro-indigenous legislation have empowered a reconstruction of 
indigenous identity at a very local level. The requirements for FPIC do stipulate that a specific, 
organized community bring the grievance forward in a court of law. Through this requirement, 
communities that have received legal information by NGO’s or through other means can 
organize to defend their rights to land, clean water, and health. Such pro-indigenous legislation 
has activated the indigenous cleavage in Peru where it had been previously suppressed. Peru’s 
highly fractionalized and localized networks of indigenous peasant communities have prevented 
the formation of a strong national indigenous movement, however this condition does not 
preclude the activation of an indigenous cleavage and community organization on the basis of 
indigenous claims.  
 These legal developments surrounding indigenous communities are illustrative of the 
complexity of finding a legal definition of indigeneity that is neither over-inclusive nor under-
inclusive. If indigenous status were to be awarded only to those who self-identify as indigenous 
on the census, which given the highly negative connotations with the word indigenous in Peru 
and the multiple identities an individual can identify with, then many communities who should 
be given indigenous status based on their use of a pre-hispanic language would not be given 
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government recognition as indigenous. However, if government recognition as indigenous were 
only given to those individuals who speak a pre-hispanic language, then communities of 
indigenous descent, who are part of the non-dominant sectors of society and have existed under 
conditions of mestizaje for longer periods of time than most other communities and have largely 
lost the practice of language, would also not be given indigenous status, even when they might 
self-identify as indigenous at any given point in time. There is a need for a more flexible 
definition of what it means to qualify as indigenous that takes into account the historical 
processes that indigenous communities and their descendants undergo, and the varied and 
malleable identity repertoire and individual can hold.  Perhaps, the best solution, is a definition 
that lacks clearly specified requirements and leaves more room for judicial interpretation. 
 The lack of self-identification surveys and the biased nature of Peru’s national census 
information make formal statistical analysis of these communities difficult. However, 
developments in Cajamarca suggest that even in areas with historically low levels of indigenous 
identification, such a cleavage can become re-activated when a grievance is present and a tool is 
made available by which to remedy this grievance. That is, when under threats, such as resource 
extraction, communities that have the capacity to identify as indigenous have an incentive to do 
so when the law awards certain protections to those communities designated as indigenous. ILO 
169 has given local indigenous communities visibility at state, regional, and international levels, 
where it had previously been denied to them. The activation of the indigenous cleavage can be 
seen as a response to the exclusive and deceivingly pro-indigenous language of FPIC, which 
grants an opportunity to participate in the dominant culture’s political processes even if in a 
limited way that does not allow these communities to secure their property rights or their cultural 
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rights. The activation of the indigenous cleavage in Perú not only shows that bodies of law can 
activate an indigenous cleavage, but also that the international environment, even if it be a highly 
unequal neoliberal one, can affect the course of ethnic mobilization.  
!31
References 
Anaya, James. 1 July 2013. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, 
James Anaya: Extractive industries and indigenous peoples. Human Rights Council, 24th 
session, A/HRC/24/41 
Arana Zegarra, P. Marco and Mirtha Vasquez. 2004.  Agua y mineras en Cajamarca: 
Defendiendo el derecho al agua, Cajamarca.  (Water and Mining in Cajamarca: 
defending the right to water, Cajamarca).  
Ministerio de Cultura de Perú. Base de Datos de Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios,. available at 
http://bdpi.cultura.gob.pe/ 
Becker, Mark. 2008. Indians and Leftists in the Making of Modern Indigenous Movements. Duke  
UP 
Brysk, Alison. 2000. From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International 
Relations in Latin America. Stanford UP. 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Faletto, Enzo. 1971. Dependency and Development in Latin 
America.  University of California Press.  
Carnoy, Martin. 1984.  The State and Political Theory.  Stanford UP. 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2006 . “ What is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?” Annual Review of 
Political Science 9: 397-424. 
Cederman,  Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. “Why do ethnic groups rebel? 
New data and analysis.” World Politics 62(1): 98-103. 
Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books. 
Gunder Frank, Andre. 1978. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. Monthly Review 
Press.  
Hechter, Michael and Dina Okamoto. 2001. “Political Consequences of Minority Group  
Formation.” Annual Review of Political Science 4(1): 189-215. 
Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California  
 Press. 
!32
Horowitz, Donald. 2003. “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers.” Journal of  
 Democracy 14(4): 115-126.  
INEI. 2007. II Censo de Comunidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Peruana.  
Federación Regional de Rondas Campesinas e Indigenas y Urbanas de Cajamarca. December 28,  
 2014. Conclusiones y Acuerdos de La Asamblea de Pueblos Originarios, Rondas  
 Campesinas, Comunidades Campesinas, Comunidades Nativas de Cajamarca.  
International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27  
June 1989, C169, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb6d514.html [accessed 
8 December 2016]. 
Lijphart, Arend. 2004. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy  
 15(2): 96 - 109.  
Madrid, Raul. 2012. The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge UP.  
Mealy, Marisa and Carol Shaw Austad. 2012. “Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the  
 Conflict in Peru.” in Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. pp.553-583.  
Monroe, Kristen Renwick, James Hankin, and Renée Bukovchik Van Vechten. 2000. “The  
 Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science  
 3(1): 419-447.  
Nagel, Joane. 1994. “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and  
Culture”.  Social Problems 41: 1001-26. 
Paredes, Martiza. 2008. “Weak Indigenous Politics in Perú”. Centre For Research on Inequality,  
Human Security and Ethnicity.  
Posner, Daniel. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. New York: Cambridge  
 University Press.  
Goulden, Jay. 2010. “Indigenous Rights In Perú Before and After Bagua: Advances and  
Setbacks.” Perú Support Group: CARE Perú.  
Reilly, Benjamin. 2002. “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 13(2): 
156-170. 
Rodríguez-Garavito, Cesar. 2011. “Ethnicity.gov: Global governance, Indigenous Peoples, and  
the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields.” 8(1) Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 263. 
!33
Salazar, Milagros. 13 February 2013. “Native Peoples Say: No Consultations, No Concessions”.   
IPS News. http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/native-peoples-say-no-consultations-no-
concessions/ [accessed December 8 2016] 
Sanborn, Cynthia A. and Alvaro Paredes. 2015. Getting it Right? Challenges to Prior  
 Consultation in Peru.  The University of Queensland, Australia, Occasional Paper Series.  
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 2002. Report of Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights  
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, submitted pursuant to Commission 
res.2001/57, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7. “United Nations Sub-commission on the Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.” 
Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of  
Ethnic Politics. New York: Cambridge UP 
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2007.  “Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict.” In Carles Boix & Susan Stokes, eds. 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford UP, pp. 274-94. 
Westra, Laura. 2008. Environmental Justice and The Rights of Indigenous Peoples. UK:  
Earthscan Publishing. 
Yashar, Deborah. 1998. “Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in 
Latin America.” Comparative Politics 31(1): 23-42. 
!34
